

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 242831

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM,-R

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS

REFS: A. MOSCOW 16558 B. MOSCOW 16693

C. STATE 236888 D. STATE 227098

E. STATE 241799

1. YOUR OBJECTIVE PRIOR TO RECESS IN CONSULTATIONS REMAINS AS STATED IN PARA 2, REF C. WE DESIRE SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO OUR IDEAS ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES INCLUDING IDEA OF POSSIBLE CONFERENCE IN NEAR FUTURE. YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT SUCH EARLY AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WOULD FACILITATE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CONFERENCE WITH
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THE SOVIETS AND OTFERS TO WHOM WE HAVE MADE SIMILAR

APPROACHES. FYI ONLY. APPROACHES TO FIVE OTHER KEY EXPORTERS OUTLINED IN REF E HAVE BEEN MADE IN WASHINGTON WITH PRELIMINARY REPEAT PRELIMINARY POSITIVE REACTIONS TO ABOVE IDEAS. END FYI.

2. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO SOVIET QUESTIONS, IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION IN REF C AND D, CAN BE USED AS APPROPRIATE IN FINAL SESSIONS OF THE CONSULTATIONS. (IN DECIDING HOW MUCH OF THE MATERIAL IN PARAS 3-5 TO USE IN RESPONDING TO

MOROKHOV, YOU SHOULD TRY TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN BEING REASONABLY RESPONSIVE AND NOT PRE-NEGOTIATING BILATERALLY WITH THE SOVIETS THE CONFERENCE RESULTS). HOWEVER, FURTHER DETAIL AS TO CONFERENCE PROCEDURES MUST AWAIT FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH ALL PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS; SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WOULD THEN BE DISCUSSED IN FRAMEWORK OF CONFERENCE ITSELF.

3. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE. US AIDE MEMOIRE STATED THAT NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NNWS SHOULD REQUIRE AGREEMENTS WHICH EXPLICITLY PRECLUDE USE OF SUPPLIED MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT FOR ANY EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND WHICH CALL FOR APPROPRIATE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON SUCH SUPPLY. FOR NNWS WHO ARE NPT PARTIES, THESE CONDITIONS WOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY SATISFIED. IN THE CASE OF RECIPIENT NNWS NON-PARTIES, THE US DOES NOT CONSIDER IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE AT THIS STAGE TO INSIST ON NPT RATIFICATION BY RECIPIENTS AS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLY. NOT ALL MAJOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS ARE NPT PARTIES, AND SOME ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO ADOPT A STRICT REQUIREMENT OF NPT ADHERENCE ON RECIPIENTS OF ALL NUCLEAR SUPPLY; HOWEVER, ALL THESE SUPPLIERS HAVE NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES, AND IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT THAT A FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TO NPT ADHERENCE SHOULD BE A CONDITION OF SUPPLY FOR AGREED ITEMS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT. FOR EXAMPLE AS SUGGESTED IN OUR AIDE MEMOIRE, FOR SUPPLY OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT OR FUEL REPROCESSING, WE BELIEVE THAT MAJOR SUPPLIERS SHOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING CONCERTED POLICIES TO SUPPLY

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SUCH ITEMS ONLY TO THOSE NNWS WHICH HAVE MADE A NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENT COMPARABLE TO ARTICLE II OF THE NPT (WHICH COVERS ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, INCLUDING PNES) AND WHICH HAVE ACCEPTED IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

4. MULTINATIONAL PLANTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES FOR REPROCESSING AND

ENRICHMENT CAN REDUCE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION RISKS, AND MAY HAVE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE TECHNOLOGY TO BE UTILIZED, LOCATION AND PARTICIPATION, AND SPECIFIC CONTROLS WOULD BE DEVELOPED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AMONG APPROPRIATE SUPPLIERS. THESE AND OTHER DETAILED MODALITIES WOULD BE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE PLANTS ARE THEMSELVES ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARDED AND THAT THE PRODUCTS OF THESE FACILITIES ARE SUBJECT TO AGREED EXPORT CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER'S STATEMENT (AT THE WASHINGTON

ENERGY CONFERENCE IN 1974) THAT QUOTE A MULTILATERAL ENRICHMENT EFFORT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN A FRAMEWORK OF ASSURED SUPPLY, GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION, AND CONTROLS AGAINST FURTHER PROLIFERATION. UNQUOTE.

5. MIDDLE EAST EXPORT CONDITIONS. OUR DESCRIPTION OF CONDITIONS WHICH WE HAD PROPOSED TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO SUPPLY OF READILY SAFEGUARDABLE REACTORS AND LOW ENRICHED URANIUM WAS INTENDED TO BE ILLUSTRATIVE OF POLICIES WHICH MAJOR SUPPLIERS COULD CONSIDER WITH REGARD TO SUPPLY TO SENSITIVE AREAS; THE OBJECTIVE OF SUCH POLICIES WOULD BE TO KEEP WEAPONS USABLE MATERIAL FROM ACCUMULATING IN SENSITIVE REGIONS. TO THIS END, OUR CONDITIONS INCLUDED NOT ONLY POSSIBLE BUY-BACK OF PLUTONIUM BUT ALSO PROVISIONS FOR PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING, STORAGE, AND FUEL FABRICATION OUTSIDE THE REGION. THE US IS ALSO SEEKING TO OBTAIN ASSURANCES FROM BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL THAT THEY WILL PLACE UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS WHICH MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO THAT NATION FROM ANY SUPPLIER.

6. THE USSR REPRESENTATIVE ASKED WHETHER ALL CONFERENCE
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PARTICIPANTS, AS SUPPLIERS, SHOULD HAVE THE OPTION TO USE PRODUCED PLUTONIUM AT THEIR DISCRETION. THE HANDLING AS WELL AS THE USE OF SUCH PRODUCED PLUTONIUM BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPLIER STATES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS AND SAFEGUARDS APPLICABLE TO PLUTONIUM IN SUCH SUPPLIER STATES. THE MAJOR NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON SUPPLIERS ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE FORMAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS COMMITMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND, IN ADDITION, THE PLUTONIUM ACQUIRED THROUGH IMPLEMENTING THE ILLUSTRATIVE CONDITIONS WOULD REPRESENT ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THAT INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED BY THESE STATES. FYI. THE SOVIETS, IN ASKING THIS QUESTION, MAY ALSO HAVE IN MIND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEY WOULD BE COMMITTED TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON PLUTONIUM WHICH THEY WOULD BUY BACK. WE DO NOT WANT TO ADDRESS THAT QUESTION AT THIS TIME.

END FYI. INGERSOLL

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